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Abstract
This paper surveys how formal verification can be used to prove the correctness of ad hoc routing protocols, which are
fundamental infrastructure of wireless sensor networks. The existing techniques fall into two classes: verification on
small-scale networks and verification on unbounded networks. The former one is always fully automatic and easy to use,
thanks to the limited state space generated in verification. However, it cannot prove the correctness over all cases. The
latter one can provide a complete proof based on abstractions of unbounded network. However, it usually needs user
intervention and expertise in verification. The two kinds of technique are illustrated by verifications against some key
properties such as stability, loop-freedom and deadlock-freedom. To conclude, they can be used to find faults and prove
correctness, respectively. We believe that they can together aid the development of correct ad hoc routing protocols and
their reliable implementations.
Keywords: formal verification, routing protocol, ad hoc network, model checking, theorem proving
1 Introduction
A wireless sensor network is composed of a large number
of sensor nodes, which are densely deployed either inside
the phenomenon to be supervised or very close to it [1].
Wireless sensor networks are widely used for sensing, event
detection etc., in military, environment, health, home and
some commercial areas. These critical applications need
correct and reliable behavior of their wireless sensor net-
works, because failures of expected functions can be catas-
trophic. Unfortunately, comparing to normal systems that
are more stable and controllable, the correctness and reli-
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ability of these networks are much harder to ensure under
variable topology, unpredictable dynamic environment and
unbounded number of parallel processes.
Wireless sensor networks are usually organized as ad hoc
network, which is a kind of network such that each node
participates in routing by forwarding data to other nodes,
without relying on any centralized infrastructure such as
router and base station [26]. Nodes can join or leave at any
time and are free to move around as they desire.
A routing protocol is an algorithm used by nodes to de-
termine a path for forwarding packets toward a destination.
Ad hoc networks usually use distance vector routing, since
centralized link state routing is not feasible due to its com-
plexity and significant cost of propagating the link states.
In distance vector routing protocols, each node maintains,
for each destination, the name of next hop and the number
of hops to reach the destination. Ad hoc routing protocols
fall into two categories: table-driven and on-demand [31].
Routing protocol is one of the most fundamental infras-
tructures of ad hoc networks. High-level functions such as
data transmission depend on the correct routes established
by routing protocols. In other words, the correctness of
routing protocols is a necessary condition of the reliable
behavior of a network.
1.1 From Simulation and Testing to For-
mal Verification
The definition of correctness of routing protocols may con-
sist of several aspects, such as stability, loop-freedom etc.
The various key properties may be verified with different
techniques, of which the two most important techniques
are: traditional simulation and testing, and more recent
formal verification.
Simulation and testing [24] are the most practiced tech-
niques for verifying the correctness of routing protocols,
since they are well understood by engineers and easy to use.
The simulations of protocols can be automatically tested us-
ing computers (e.g. ns2), and the implementations of pro-
tocols can be tested on a real ad hoc network. Some faults
can be discovered during simulation and testing, and then
fixed by engineers. Thus, they can improve the probability
that a protocol achieves the desired functions.
However, the most important shortcoming of simulation
and testing is coverage. Note that we would first have to
fix the network size and topology, then run the protocol
for a limited length of time. A testing procedure starts
from a given initial state, and only a single execution is ob-
served and checked. Although the result is informative, it
does not provide a complete verification, since a full proof
should guarantee the correctness on all networks, over all
lengths of time, under all possible initial states, and for ev-
ery sequence of events that can occur. Since simulation and
testing cannot cover all these cases in running a protocol
(and the coverage cannot be proved even if it is actually
sufficient), they reduce the level of assurance in correct-
ness. Indeed, there may be some subtle faults that remain
hidden in a few tests, but might lead to serious failures in
future operations.
Formal verification (or formal method) is a kind of math-
ematical reasoning about systems. Formal verification pro-
vides more trustable verification results, thanks to their ex-
haustive searching of all possible executions. This means, if
it is proved that a protocol satisfies some properties, then
the result holds for all cases on all networks. The invention
of some automated analysis techniques makes formal veri-
fication more and more feasible in practice. For instance,
model checkers [12, 2] can automatically enumerate all pos-
sible executions of a system, and verify a property over
these executions, while theorem provers [15] provide au-
tomated formal support for the creation and checking of
proofs. However, model checkers suffer the state explosion
problem1, and the weakness of theorem provers is the sig-
nificant user intervention. We believe that, the combina-
tion of manual mathematical reasoning, automated model
checking and automated theorem proving is a more practi-
cal alternative for verifying large(-scale) systems.
1.2 Difficulties in Formal Verification
As we mentioned, the state explosion problem is one key
impediment in making automatic model checking of large
systems feasible in practice. Unfortunately, in the domain
of verifying ad hoc routing protocols, this problem becomes
more serious due to some new challenges.
Ad hoc routing protocols for mobile or wireless sensor
networks are quite different from those for other types of
network because of considerations like the large number of
nodes, and highly variable and unreliable connectivity [7].
To address these new features, a routing protocol generally
includes the following attributes:
1. support an essentially unbounded number of replicated
concurrent processes. Each process implements the
protocol and runs on a node. The protocol should work
well on unbounded number of nodes.
2. dynamic and highly variable connectivity is assumed.
Thus, the protocol should ensure reliable routing under
continuously changing topology.
3. unreliable connectivity is assumed which may lead to
nondeterministic loss of packets. Thus, fault tolerance
is required, i.e. the protocol should tolerate the loss of
packets.
4. real-time constraints are important, since many actions
are triggered by timeout events.
1A state space is a directed graph where each possible state of a
dynamical system is represented by a vertex, and there is a directed
edge if and only if there is a state transition from one state to an-
other. In words, the state space consists of all the states generated
in verification. The state explosion problem is the fact that the state
space grows exponentially in the number of processes, resulting in an
intractable size.
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5. low-bandwidth links between nodes are assumed.
Thus, the protocol should transmit packets and occupy
bandwidth as less as possible.
These attributes influence the way formal verification can
be applied. As a result, verifying ad hoc routing protocols
should consider the following special issues:
1. A protocol should be verified on unbounded number
of replicated processes that execute concurrently. A
proof that works for two or three nodes is not trustable,
unless it can be generalized. Therefore, the verifica-
tion methodology should be optimized to deal with
unbounded number of processes. For example, the op-
timizations of model checking should obviously reduce
the generated state spaces.
2. Nondeterministic connectivity changes should be mod-
eled, in order to show the correctness under dynamic
and highly variable connectivity.
3. Nondeterministic loss of packets should be modeled, in
order to show the correctness under unreliable connec-
tivity.
4. Some real-time features should be modeled and veri-
fied, in order to ensure the rationality of real-time con-
straints.
It is easy to see that the unbounded number of processes is
one important source of the state explosion problem of ver-
ification, because they execute concurrently and lead to a
huge state space. Since we must prove the correctness on all
networks, the complexity of verification is increased. Fur-
thermore, model checking on all networks is generally not
feasible, since we have infinite number of networks which
cannot be enumerated.
Another source is the large number of possible topologies
for a given number of nodes in an ad hoc network. Gener-
ally, a network can be modeled as a graph. A node repre-
sents a wireless sensor or a mobile router etc. An edge rep-
resents the connection between two nodes. The graph (i.e.
topology) may dynamically change due to variable links,
mobility of nodes, etc. Note that each node is different,
since they have unique identities. Suppose a bidirectional
network containing n nodes, a full graph contains n×(n−1)2
edges. So the number of possible topologies is
T = 2
n×(n−1)
2
For unidirectional networks, this number grows to
T ′ = 2n×(n−1)
This is an O(2n
2
) order number of possible topologies2. For
example, if n = 5, T = 1024. When n = 6, the number
rapidly grows to T = 32768.
2Note that the computation of possible topologies on Page 1182 of
[13] is not correct, since they imposed a lot of restrictions on possible
topologies.
The large number of possible topologies influences the
state space in two aspects. First, the number leads to a
large number of possible initial states of the state space.
Since we must prove the correctness under all possible initial
states, the complexity of verification is increased. Second, it
is normal that the topology changes continuously during the
operation, due to events such as broken or new links, broken
or new nodes, etc. As a result, a large number of possible
topologies may be nondeterministically reached during the
execution. Since we must prove the correctness for every
sequence of events that can occur, the large number can
greatly influence the complexity of verification.
Due to the O(2n
2
) order number of possible topologies,
the state explosion problem becomes much more serious
than verifying other applications. Indeed, in the litera-
ture, most current model checking tools can only be applied
to networks containing five or six nodes. Memory can be
rapidly ran out when checking protocols on larger networks.
1.3 Overview
We should consider two things when applying formal verifi-
cation to ad hoc routing protocols. First, we need to spec-
ify the key properties that should be satisfied by protocols,
and then choose appropriate tools to formally model sys-
tems and verify these properties. Second, we should care-
fully use appropriate verification techniques to deal with the
state explosion problem, and optimize our techniques with
respect to two factors: the unbounded number of nodes and
the large number of possible topologies for a given number
of nodes.
This paper is organized as follows. The tools for verifica-
tion are briefly introduced in Section 2. The key properties
that are expected to satisfy are described in Section 3. The
two classes of formal verification techniques are reviewed in
Section 4. We discuss challenges and future work in Section
5, and conclude in Section 6.
The case studies in this paper concern the Border Gate-
way Protocol (BGP) [29, 30] which is the principal exterior
gateway protocol, and the protocols for interior gateway
such as the Routing Information Protocol (RIP) [16, 22, 23]
which is a table-driven distance vector routing protocol us-
ing the asynchronous distributed Bellman-Ford protocol,
the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing
protocol [27, 28], and the Lightweight Underlay Network
Ad-Hoc Routing Protocol (LUNAR) [34] which is a simpli-
fied AODV-like protocol.
2 Tool Support
In this section, we introduce some useful tools for verifying
routing protocols. Some of the tools are fully automatic,
e.g., SPIN and UPPAAL, whereas the others are based on
user intervention, e.g., HOL.
The SPIN model checker [17, 19] has been widely used to
verify communication protocols. A system (e.g. a network)
is modeled using the Promela language (a C-style language
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with communication operations), while a property is speci-
fied as a finite state automaton or an LTL (Linear Tempo-
ral Logic [21]) formula. SPIN can simulate the execution
of the system, and more importantly, SPIN can perform an
exhaustive search to check whether the property holds over
all possible executions of the system. The verification pro-
cess is fully automatic. If the property is violated in some
execution, SPIN will provide a counterexample to aid fault
diagnosis and revision of the system.
The UPPAAL model checker [4] is an integrated tool en-
vironment for modeling, validation and verification of real-
time systems modeled as networks of timed automata, ex-
tended with data types (bounded integers, arrays, etc.) and
channel synchronization. A system is modeled using timed
automata which are drawn in a graphical user interface,
while a property is specified as a CTL (Computation Tree
Logic [21]) formula. UPPAAL contains also a simulator
and a checker. The verification process is fully automatic,
and provides a counterexample if the property is violated
in some execution.
The HOL theorem prover system [15] is a general purpose
verification environment based on Higher-Order Logic. A
system is modeled as functions using a functional program-
ming language, while a property is specified using higher-
order logic. HOL uses a proof assistant that allows the
user to construct proofs of such properties by using certain
proof techniques. The proof assistant ensures the complete-
ness and fault-freedom of the proofs. Theoretically, HOL
is a general tool and capable of proving any mathematical
theorem. Note that designing the proof strategy depends
on expertise and user intervention, rather than complete
automation.
These tools have their own merits and shortcomings.
Model checkers, such as SPIN and UPPAAL, offer more
comprehensive modeling language and fully automatic ver-
ification process, thus is easier to use. However, the bottle-
necks of model checkers are memory and expressiveness. If
we use them on a large network, the state space is so huge
that the memory can be rapidly ran out. Furthermore,
their models can only express limited number of processes,
thus the unbounded number of nodes are generally beyond
their expressiveness. On the other hand, theorem provers,
such as HOL, offer more powerful but more complex math-
ematical infrastructures for developing more general proofs.
Therefore, as a shortcoming, they need more expertise and
user intervention, thus cost more programmer-months.
We believe that a better strategy is to combine the two
types of tool. We may first verify a protocol using au-
tomated model checkers such as SPIN and UPPAAL, on
some typical, fixed and small(-scale) networks. Although
the proof is not complete, some faults will be discovered
and then fixed. Once we ensure the correctness of the pro-
tocol on these small networks, we may use theorem provers
such as HOL to generalize the result.
For example, one instance of the strategy is to code a
protocol first in SPIN and use HOL to address the limits of
SPIN. This can be achieved by using HOL to prove the the-
orems on abstractions showing properties such as: if prop-
erties P1, ..., Pn hold for small sets of (maybe abstracted)
nodes S1, ..., Sn, respectively, then property P will hold
for arbitrarily many nodes. We use the abstraction proofs
in HOL to reduce the memory demands of SPIN proofs,
since each property Pi is checked on a small enough (ab-
stract) network Si. The abstraction proofs may also solve
the problem of expressiveness. In fact, we largely reserve
the comprehensibility and automation of model checking,
but significantly reduce the memory demands of checking
and increase the expressiveness of models by allowing user
intervention in proving the theorems on abstractions. In
essence, this strategy makes a tradeoff between memory
consumption and the level of user intervention.
3 Specifying Key Properties
Before verifying routing protocols, we need first to specify
the properties that are expected to be satisfied. In this
section, we introduce four key and generic properties to be
verified and the way of specifying them. We start from
defining two basic concepts.
First, we define the reachability to a destination as fol-
lows.
Definition 1 (Reachability) A destination d is reach-
able from a node n, if there exists a path from n to d no
greater than N hops, where N is the maximum hop count
allowed by the protocol.
In every routing protocol, the maximum number of hops in
a route is always limited. For example, RIP sets the max-
imum number of hops to N = 15. The protocols that use
16 or 32 bits for the hop count field of routing packet allow
maximum N = 216 − 1 or N = 232 − 1 hops, respectively.
Second, the correctness of a routing protocol is defined
as follows [35].
Definition 2 (Correct operation of an ad hoc rout-
ing protocol) If a destination node is reachable from a
source node at one point in time, then the protocol must be
able to find some path between the nodes. When a path has
been found, and for the time it stays valid, it shall be pos-
sible to send packets along the path from the source node to
the destination node.
This generic definition implicitly indicates several concrete
properties3. We list some important ones as follows.
1. One important correctness property is stability: for
each destination d that is reachable from a node n,
the node n will eventually obtain a correct (optimal or
shortest) route to d. A similar property is convergence:
3Note that the correctness properties listed in [25] are not correct.
For example, the property (1) in Section 5 of [25] cannot be satisfied,
since it is normal that an ad hoc network is not fully connected at
some time due to dynamic and variable connectivity. Furthermore,
the author neither discussed how to express these properties using
LTL or other formalisms.
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a network can reach stability and does not change the
established routes further, assuming the topology stays
unchanged during this period.
2. Another property related to stability is the real time
convergence bound for stability. We may want to cal-
culate how much time it must cost to reach stability,
assuming the topology stays unchanged during this pe-
riod of time.
3. Loop-freedom is an important property for distance
vector routing protocols. A loop is a forwarding cir-
cle in the route from the source to its destination. If
a loop route is established, packets will be transmitted
in the loop but never reach the destination.
4. It is also expected that deadlock should not occur when
running a protocol.
Given a protocol, we need to show that these four generic
properties are satisfied in all cases. These objectives can
be achieved by formal verification, but may using different
techniques and tools.
4 Techniques for Formal Verifica-
tion
In this section, we present different ways of modeling ad
hoc networks and specifying key properties, and various
techniques for verifying the models against the properties.
We categorize these verification techniques into two classes.
The first class applies verification on small networks.
Thanks to the limited size, the model can be established
without abstractions. The advantage is that the system
model is intuitive and easy to understand. Moreover, the
verification could be fully automatic, thus much is gained in
ease of use for non-experts, and some violations of proper-
ties could be found. These valuable information can be used
to aid the correction of protocols. However, this method
cannot cover all cases, since a network may consist of un-
bounded number of nodes.
The second class applies verification on unbounded net-
works. In this case, we try to show the correctness over
all cases. Due to unbounded number of nodes, abstractions
must be used in modeling. The advantage is that the proof
is complete. However, due to the state explosion problem,
a fully automatic checking is not possible. Thus, mathe-
matical reasoning and abstract modeling must be involved.
This needs high expertise in the verification domain.
No matter which class, we must first decide how to model
a network running ad hoc routing protocols by considering
the following questions.
1. How do we model each node running the protocol?
2. How do we model the connectivity between nodes?
3. How do we model communications such as broadcast
and unicast?
4. How do we model topology changes?
Then we will consider the verification questions, such as,
how do we specify the key properties using the formalism
supported by the tools? We will show the answers by con-
sidering the two classes of verification techniques in the fol-
lowing subsections respectively.
4.1 Verification on Small Networks
Generally, a small network (e.g., three to six nodes) that
runs a protocol on each node can be modeled and exhaus-
tively checked with automated model checkers, since the
state space is usually less than available memory. In this
case, each node is explicitly modeled as a process, which
is described using the Promela programming language of
SPIN or formalized as a timed automaton in UPPAAL.
4.1.1 Using SPIN
In SPIN, a protocol is usually coded as a process type
proctype in Promela, which is then instantiated as several
processes where each process denotes a node. They com-
municate through channels. Therefore, the most common
verification methodology in the literature answers the mod-
eling questions as follows:
1. each node is modeled as a process, i.e., an instance of
a process type that implements the protocol.
2. the connectivity between nodes is either hard-coded
into the process types, or managed by an intermediate
connection process or a topology manager process.
3. communications such as broadcast and unicast are
modeled as messages through channels.
4. the events of topology changes can be either nondeter-
ministically generated by an intermediate environment
process or a topology manager process, or implemented
by nondeterministic choices in the process types.
We will show the details in the following case studies.
The BGP protocol was modeled using the SPIN model
checker, and then the convergence property was verified on
four sample configurations, including good, disagree, pre-
carious and bad gadgets [20]. The convergence property
was verified by using two LTL formulas. The checking re-
sults of the two formulas can together show whether a BGP
routing policy configuration will converge on a solution for a
particular network destination, and the probability of con-
vergence, i.e. completely solvable, partially solvable or un-
solvable.
In the model, (1) The routers are modeled as Promela
processes. (2) The connectivity is hard-coded into the
process types through establishing communication chan-
nels. (3) Communications are modeled as messages through
channels. (4) The topology is assumed to be not changed
during this period. The convergence property is decided by
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A B D
Figure 1: A Simple 3-Node Network
considering the following two properties, which are verified
in SPIN over some small network models.
<> [ ] p where p denotes all channels are empty,
i.e., possibly converge.
<> [ ] q where q denotes some channels are not empty,
i.e., possibly never converge.
In words, the first formula specifies that the protocol will
possibly converge in the future, i.e., formally, after some
time in the future of any execution, for all the succeeding
states, it always holds that all channels are empty. Sim-
ilarly, the second formula specifies that the protocol will
possibly never converge in the future.
The results of the verifications of the two formulas can
help draw a conclusion whether a BGP network configu-
ration will guarantee convergence for a particular network
destination. Note that it is hard to generalize this approach
to large networks due to the state explosion problem, and
also dynamic topology changes are not addressed in the
work.
A model of AODV protocol was created using Promela
in SPIN (302 lines of code), and it was attempted to prove
loop-freedom for a simple 3-node network [7]4. The network
consists of three nodes, A, B and D, as shown in Fig. 1.
The node A has an active link to B, and B has an active
link to D. Both A and B want to send data to the only
destination D. The link B-D is fragile and may be broken
at any time.
In the model, (1) The process type of AODV proto-
col is instantiated as three processes running at the three
nodes. The timeout events are modeled as nondetermin-
istic events that can occur at any time (in fact, it is an
over-approximation), since Promela has no notion of real
time. (2) The connectivity of the topology is hard-coded
as a connection process running in parallel that captures
all sent messages and delivers them when appropriate. (3)
Broadcasting messages are captured by the process, which
then delivers these messages to the sender’s neighbors im-
mediately. For such a fixed small topology, hard-coding
has significant performance advantages in SPIN. (4) The
fragility of the B-D link is modeled as an environment pro-
cess which can nondeterministically send link-broken events
to both B and D at any time. The property to verify is that
there cannot be a routing loop between A and B, for any
sequence of events. The following LTL formula expresses
the loop-free property:
[ ] (!(nextD(A) == B && nextD(B) == A))
4All the codes used in [7] are available at
http://www.cis.upenn.edu/verinet/RoutingVerification
In words, for all the states in any execution, it is should
never occur that the next pointers of A and B for the des-
tination D point to each other.
By running SPIN, a number of counterexamples are
found and guide the revision of the draft of the protocol
(version 2). The design and model of the protocol are mod-
ified several times until SPIN cannot find a loop. Note that
SPIN cannot be sure that the fixed protocol will produce
no loops for any network, since we only considered a 3-node
network rather than unbounded nodes. However, it may in-
dicate that we have found a possibly loop-free solution.
It is also suggested to model each node as a process in
[25]. These processes manage their own connectivity to
other nodes, and also the communication functions. Fur-
thermore, a Location Manager (LM) process is specified to
generate topology changes. That is, it nondeterministically
decides when and what sensors change their locations and
their connectivity to other nodes. The location manager
process supports the following activities5:
• dynamic creation of new nodes, i.e., new processes.
• dynamic deletion of nodes, i.e., disconnection or termi-
nation of processes.
• dynamic creation of new edges, i.e., new connection.
• dynamic deletion of edges, i.e., disconnection between
two nodes.
Node processes listen to LM, and adjust their connectiv-
ity with other nodes based on received messages from LM.
Note that this modeling approach can only be used on small
networks containing finite nodes, due to the state explosion
problem.
In some other works, it is also admitted that the state ex-
plosion problem is a key impedient of model checking rout-
ing protocols due to mobility of nodes. Therefore, people
only considered and modeled a five node network includ-
ing a sender, a receiver and three intermediates in [13]. A
lot of restrictions on the model configurations have been
imposed to obtain a simplified basic model, e.g., limiting
the number of possible links of each node, constraints on
the possible topologies, etc. These simplifications can sig-
nificantly reduce the state space in checking, but may also
greatly reduce the confidence of the result.
In the model, (1) Each node is modeled as a process of
simplified protocol. (2) The connectivity is saved in the
routing table of each node. (3) Each node X has a channel
braodcastX only through which it can receive messages.
The broadcasting operation is coded into each process to
send messages to connected neighbors. (4) Node mobility is
realized by canceling all routing table entries of the moving
node, and setting a new link initialization for this node.
One shortcoming of this method is extensibility. If we want
to extend the verification to the models containing more
nodes, more efforts are required to modify the code.
5Note that this definition of Location Manager is slightly different
from [25], since we also take into account the variable edges.
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Based on the established basic model, the properties of
deadlock and loop-freedom are checked. However, as we
mentioned, due to the limited number of nodes and the
restrictions on the configurations (e.g., possible links and
topologies), the verification result is not trustable enough.
It is also suggested that, when checking on large networks,
SPIN can be used in the supertrace mode with the bitstate
hashing technique [18] to save memory, with the cost of
slightly reducing the coverage to about 98% [13].
A general model of LUNAR was created using Promela in
SPIN (about 250 lines of code excluding comments) [35, 36].
In the model, (1) Each node is a process instantiating the
process type of a simplified version of LUNAR, where com-
munication ports are modeled as channels stored in an array
indexed by node id. (2) Connectivity is modeled as a sym-
metric, two dimensional array of booleans. The matrix is
symmetric since the protocol assumes bidirectional connec-
tions. (3) Broadcast is modeled by unicasting to all nodes
with whom the sending node has connectivity at that time.
The unicast operations consisting a broadcast are imple-
mented atomically to ensure its atomicity. (4) Topology
changes are modeled using a separate process, which can
modify the global connectivity matrix at any time.
In the verification, only one source and one destination
are selected. The topology and node transitions are also
selected, so that the two nodes are always connected. A
hop counter is defined to keep track of the number of nodes
traversed by the packet before it reaches its destination.
Based on the model, the properties of deadlock and loop-
freedom are checked. Loop-freedom is formalized as the
assertion: a packet does not traverse more nodes than the-
oretically possible before the packet reaches its destination.
Absence of deadlock is formalized as a liveness property
such that the packet will eventually be delivered in the fu-
ture.
Their first verification attempt is to generate nondeter-
ministically a topology for a given number of nodes, then
the protocol is verified on each generated topology. Thus,
all possible topologies are considered. However, the state
space is too large to be efficiently checked. When node mo-
bility is added, an exhaustive search is no longer feasible
even for a small number of nodes.
Therefore, their second attempt focuses on a few typical
scenarios (containing four or five nodes, and once or twice
simple topology changes) which seem to cause problems for
the protocol. The bitstate hashing option is not used in the
verification to ensure reliable result. The checker cannot
exhaustively search all the states when there are more than
five nodes due to the memory limit of 36GB.
4.1.2 Using UPPAAL
If we use UPPAAL, real time constraints could be ex-
pressed. For example, a UPPAAL model was constructed
to check timing requirements of LUNAR [35]. The model
uses more abstraction than the SPIN model, because more
complex data structures than arrays are not available in
UPPAAL. In the model,
1. each node is modeled as a timed automaton implement-
ing the protocol.
2. connectivity is modeled as a symmetric, two dimen-
sional array of booleans.
3. broadcasting is handled similarly to unicasting, except
the sender has to send a request to the medium au-
tomaton. The medium distributes the broadcasting to
other automata. The connectivity check is deferred to
the receiving nodes, and value passing is realized by a
combination of global data holders and committed lo-
cations, since broadcast channels in UPPAAL can only
be used for synchronization rather than value passing.
4. topology changes are modeled using a separate au-
tomaton, which can modify the global connectivity ma-
trix at any time.
Again, in the verification, only one source node and one
destination are selected. The source tries to set up a route
to the destination after which it attempts to send a packet
there. Different from the SPIN model, communication de-
lays can be modeled here, in order to take into account
the influence caused by the delay of transmitting packets
between nodes, i.e., latencies of information flow.
In the verification, if the route could be set up, the ini-
tiating node lunar0 goes into the state unic_rrep_rec. If
the correct packet arrives at the receiver lunar1, it goes
into the state ip_rec_ok. The properties can be expressed
as CTL formulas:
• deadlock freedom: A[] not deadlock.
• route successfully set up: A<> lunar0.uni_rrep_rec.
• IP packet delivered: A<> lunar1.ip_rec_ok.
Their verification attempts applied the same constraints on
initial topologies and topology changes as using SPIN, due
to the state explosion problem.
4.1.3 Summary
Some faults of a protocol could be discovered in the au-
tomatic model checking on small networks. These tools
provide useful counterexamples for debugging and revising
the implementation of the protocol. However, the proof is
not complete, i.e., it is not ensured that the properties will
hold in all cases and on all networks. Anyway, the experi-
ments on small networks provide a possibly correct solution.
Thus, we need some techniques to generalize the results on
unbounded network.
4.2 Verification on Unbounded Networks
Large networks containing unbounded nodes cannot be
modeled and checked directly, because the state space is too
large to be efficiently verified by automated model checkers.
We may introduce theorem provers to obtain a complete
proof based on some checked properties that hold on some
small sets of (maybe abstracted) nodes.
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4.2.1 Stability
Let us consider how to prove stability of a protocol on arbi-
trary network. We must show that, for each destination d
that is reachable from some nodes, the nodes will all even-
tually obtain a correct path to d. We denote by N the
maximum hop count allowed by the protocol.
Our case study will show the stability of RIP (here N =
15). The proof starts from choosing an arbitrary destination
d. This can simplify the verification to deal with only one
destination.
An entry for a destination d at a node r consists of at least
two parameters: (1) hops(r) denotes the current estimate
of the distance metric to d; (2) NextR(r) denotes the next
node on the route to d. Initially, the nodes connected to d
have their metric set to 1, while others have values greater
than 1. The distance (i.e. the length of shortest path) from
r to d is defined as:
D(r) =
{
1, if r is connected to d,
1 +min{D(s) | s neighbor of r}, otherwise.
For k ≥ 1, the k-circle around d is Ck = {r | D(r) ≤ k},
i.e. the set of nodes whose distance to d is no greater than
k. For 1 ≤ k ≤ N , the universe is k-stable if the following
properties both hold:
(S1) For every node r ∈ Ck, hops(r) = D(r), i.e. ev-
ery node r ∈ Ck has its metric set to the actual
distance. Moreover, if r is not connected to d, then
D(nextR(r)) = D(r) − 1, i.e. its next hop’s distance
to d is one hop shorter, which ensures the correct di-
rection of the link that leads to d.
(S2) For every node r 6∈ Ck, hops(r) > k.
In words, all nodes inside Ck have converged to the correct
routes, while the outer nodes may not have found their
correct routes. The protocol aims to expand the k-stable
circle until all nodes are contained in the N -stable circle.
Given a k-stable universe, a node r such thatD(r) = k+1
is (k + 1)-stable if hops(r) = k + 1 and nextR(r) ∈ Ck. In
words, a node r at distance k+1 from d has found a shortest
route.
The stability of RIP, i.e. each node eventually finds all
the shortest paths to its reachable destinations, is formally
defined as follows.
Theorem 3 (Stability of RIP) For any k ≤ N , starting
from an arbitrary initial state of the universe U , for any fair
sequence of update messages, there is a time tk such that U
is k-stable at all times t ≥ tk.
In particular, we want to show that N -stability will be
reached. The theorem can be decomposed into the following
lemmas and proved by induction on k.
Lemma 4 (Basis) The universe U is initially 1-stable.
Lemma 5 (Preservation of Stability) For any k ≤ N ,
if the universe U is k-stable at some time t, then it is k-
stable at any time t′ ≥ t.
Lemma 6 For any k < N and node r such that D(r) =
k+1, if the universe is k-stable at some time tk, then there
is a time tr,k ≥ tk such that r is (k + 1)-stable at all times
t ≥ tr,k.
Lemma 7 (Progress) For any k < N , if the universe U
is k-stable at some time tk, then there is a time tk+1 ≥ tk
such that U is (k + 1)-stable at all times t ≥ tk+1.
To prove these lemmas, RIP is modeled in both SPIN
and HOL. The SPIN model of RIP has 141 lines of code,
while the HOL model has 495 lines of code.
Lemma 4 is easily proved by HOL. In fact, it is also easy
to manually validate the lemma from the definition of k-
stability.
To prove Lemma 5, we need to show that a k-stable uni-
verse remains k-stable after an arbitrary update message.
This could be done with only HOL, or with HOL and SPIN
together. If we use SPIN, we must construct a nice ab-
straction of the universe to avoid the unbounded number of
nodes and processes. The abstraction contains only three
processes (207 lines of code).
1. In a k-stable universe, the k-circle always sends the dis-
tance metric of k hops to the outside world. Therefore,
the k-circle can be modeled by a single process P that
always sends the distance metric of k hops.
2. All the nodes outside the k-circle send to the k-circle all
the distance metrics strictly greater than k. Therefore,
the outside world can be modeled by a process Q that
always sends arbitrary distances greater than k.
3. For a node r such that D(r) = k + 1, it runs a nor-
mal RIP process R. We abstract its environment and
replace it with processes P and Q.
Using this abstraction, the unbounded universe U effec-
tively reduces to three processes P , Q, R. Note that the
abstraction is finitary, since it reduces the system to a fixed
finite number of states. This makes the state space of the
abstraction can be exhaustively explored by a model checker
like SPIN. It is also property-preserving with respect to the
desired properties. Whenever the abstraction satisfies a
property, the concrete system also satisfies the property.
This makes sure that the verification over the abstraction
is sound. We can prove in HOL that the abstraction is
property-preserving for the node r.
Lemma 6 is proved with SPIN using the same abstrac-
tion. The idea can be summarized as follows: we justify the
abstraction using a theorem prover, and then we prove the
property of the abstraction using a model checker.
Lemma 7 is proved by HOL as an easy generalization of
Lemma 6, because there are finite number of nodes. Fi-
nally, Theorem 3 is proved by HOL from Lemmas 4, 5, 7 by
induction on k. Again, it is also easy to manually validate
Lemma 7 and Theorem 3 instead of using HOL.
It is worth noting that the property of stability on net-
works of unbounded nodes is decomposed into several prop-
erties on some small abstractions consisting of only a few
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processes, which significantly reduces the memory con-
sumption of model checking. Furthermore, note that the
environment processes P and Q may generate some mes-
sage sequences that are not possible in reality. This is a kind
of property-preserving over-approximation in model check-
ing. Additionally, sometimes automated theorem provers
like HOL are not necessary for proving some lemmas or
theorems. Because some proofs may be easily constructed
by hand, especially when the proofs are either short or not
complex.
4.2.2 Real-time Convergence Bound for Stability
Note that stability is proved under the assumption that the
topology stays unchanged for some period of time. The real-
time convergence bound is how big that period of time must
be. This bound is based on the following timing assump-
tion: during every time interval of the length ∆, each node
gets at least one update message from each of its neighbors.
For RIP, ∆ equals 3 minutes.
We define the radius of the universe with respect to d as
R = max{D(r) | r is a node}, i.e. the maximum distance
from d. The real-time convergence bound of RIP is the
following one:
Theorem 8 (Convergence Bound of RIP) A uni-
verse of radius R becomes N -stable within min{N,R} · ∆
time, assuming that there were no topology changes during
that time interval.
Again, this theorem can be similarly decomposed into
four lemmas and proved by induction on k. The verification
methodology is similar to that of RIP stability discussed
earlier. We will not repeat the details here, the reader is
referred to Section 5 of [7].
4.2.3 Loop-freedom
Let us consider how to prove loop-freedom of a protocol
on arbitrary network. Our case study will show that the
ADOV protocol is loop-free. As specified in its standard,
AODV protocol uses sequence numbers to avoid the forma-
tion of routing loops, a well-known shortcoming of RIP.
For arbitrary node n and destination d, we write
seqnod(n)(t) to denote n’s sequence number for d at the
time t. Similar notation is used for hopsd(n)(t) and
nextd(n)(t). The parameter (t) may be omitted if the
given time is clear. We write restart(n)(t) to denote n
was restarted at time t.
Our objective is the following theorem.
Theorem 9 (Loop-freedom of AODV) For an arbi-
trary network of nodes running AODV, there will be no
routing loops formed.
Theorem 9 can be inferred from the following theorem.
Theorem 10 For every destination d, if nextd(n) = n
′,
then
1. seqnod(n) ≤ seqnod(n
′), and
2. if seqnod(n) = seqnod(n
′), then hopsd(n) > hopsd(n
′).
The proof of Theorem 9 by Theorem 10 can be done in
HOL. However, it is worth noting that HOL is not nec-
essary. Because it is easy to construct a manual proof of
Theorem 9 assuming Theorem 10. Assume there is a loop
n1 → n2 → · · · → nk → n1, then we have seqnod(n1) ≤
seqnod(n2) ≤ · · · ≤ seqnod(nk) ≤ seqnod(n1) by Theorem
10(1). So, it is must be seqnod(n1) = seqnod(n2) = · · · =
seqnod(nk) = seqnod(n1). By Theorem 10(2), we have
hopsd(n1) > hopsd(n2) > · · · > hopsd(nk) > hopsd(n1).
Note that hopsd(n1) > hopsd(n1) is a contradiction. There-
fore, there does not exist a loop.
Theorem 10 can be decomposed into the following lem-
mas.
Lemma 11 If t1 ≤ t2, and ∀t : t1 < t ≤ t2, ¬restart(n)(t),
then seqnod(n)(t1) ≤ seqnod(n)(t2).
Lemma 12 If t1 ≤ t2, and ∀t : t1 < t ≤ t2, ¬restart(n)(t),
and seqnod(n)(t1) = seqnod(n)(t2), then hopsd(n)(t1) ≥
hopsd(n)(t2).
Lemma 13 If nextd(n)(t) = n
′, then there exists a last
update time lut ≤ t, such that:
1. seqnod(n)(t) = seqnod(n
′)(lut), and
2. hopsd(n)(t) = 1 + hopsd(n
′)(lut), and
3. ∀t′ : lut < t′ ≤ t, ¬restart(n′)(t′).
Lemma 11 says that the sequence number for a single des-
tination never decreases over time, unless the node restarts.
Lemma 12 says that the hop count does not increase over
time if the sequence number does not change. Lemma 13
says that if n points to n′, then this must be the result of
an update message sent from n′ to n at time lut, and n′
cannot have restarted after time lut. It is easy to see that
the lemmas together imply Theorem 10 by constructing a
hand proof.
Now we consider how to prove the three lemmas. Note
that Lemmas 11 and 12 are properties over a single node
n, and Lemma 13 is a property over two nodes n and n′.
This means, we have reduced the loop-free property on an
unbounded network to several local properties on one or
two processes. Each of the lemmas is individually proved
in SPIN.
At first, we model AODV protocol in SPIN. The model
has 302 lines of code.
To prove Lemma 11, we construct an abstraction of the
universe to avoid the unbounded number of nodes and pro-
cesses. The abstraction contains only two processes.
1. The node n runs a normal AODV process A.
2. All the nodes other than n are modeled as a single envi-
ronment process E that generates all possible messages
to A.
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Using this abstraction, the unbounded universe is effectively
reduced to two processes A and E. We need to prove that,
in this model, the sequence number of A never decreases.
The abstraction is finitary and property-preserving. This
makes the abstraction can be automatically checked in
SPIN.
Lemmas 12 and 13 are proved with SPIN using the same
abstraction. Each of the lemmas can be effectively checked
in SPIN, thanks to the small number of processes. Finally,
Theorem 10 is easily proved by Lemmas 11, 12, 13 with
HOL or hand proof.
It is worth noting that the property of loop-freedom on
networks of unbounded nodes is decomposed into several
local properties on a small abstraction consisting of only
two processes, which significantly reduces the memory con-
sumption of model checking. Furthermore, note that the en-
vironment process E may generate some message sequences
that are not possible in reality. This is a kind of property-
preserving over-approximation in model checking. Addi-
tionally, sometimes automated theorem provers like HOL
are not necessary for proving some lemmas or theorems.
Because some proofs may be easily constructed by hand,
especially when the proofs are either short or not complex.
5 Challenges and Future Work
As we know, the biggest challenge comes from the model
checking algorithms, which generate a huge and intractable
state space in checking. To address this issue, new improve-
ments of checking algorithms are being developed to re-
duce the state space, such as [10]. And some parallel model
checking algorithms have been proposed recently [5, 3]. Ex-
tending existing verification tools with distributed checking
algorithms may gain higher speed and better performance.
This may enable the automatic checking of larger fixed net-
works and a wider range of scenarios.
Another challenge could be enhancing the automation
level of theorem provers. Currently, most engineers are not
capable of using provers, due to the lack of enough mathe-
matical knowledge on that. Less user interaction may accel-
erate the application of theorem provers in industrial veri-
fication practice.
Challenge also comes from the engineers’ expectation
that the verification should be done on the real implementa-
tions of protocols such as codes, rather than on the models.
As we know, subtle but fatal faults may be introduced, even
when we are implementing a verified correct model. Direct
checking of real codes would be more attractive and useful
to engineers, since it can fill the gap between the model and
the implementation of a protocol.
In the future, we may study how to assure the security
of routing protocols, which is related to but different from
the correctness and reliability of routing protocols that have
been discussed in this survey. Some recent works tried to
explore the approaches for model checking wireless sensor
network security protocols, in order to decide the existence
of attacks, such as route disruption, route diversion etc.
[33, 6].
Another future direction could be the development of the
languages for constructing wireless sensor network applica-
tions. A recent work introduced such a language named
Insense, which supports a component-based model for wire-
less sensor network applications, and can facilitate the con-
struction of low-level software for a concurrent, real-time
and resource-constrained computing environment [14]. Fur-
thermore, the correctness of the implementations of send
and receive operations was verified using SPIN on some
typical small network models consisting of less than four
nodes [32].
Finally, we may also explore other techniques for verify-
ing protocols such as runtime monitoring and control [11, 9],
and their theoretical foundations like ω-automata [8]. We
will try to apply these techniques to real-world applications
like RFID networks [38] and pervasive computing environ-
ments [37, 39].
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we reviewed two classes of formal verification
techniques for verifying the correctness of ad hoc routing
protocols: verification on small-scale networks and verifica-
tion on unbounded networks. The former one is always fully
automatic and easy to use, thanks to the limited state space
generated in verification. However, it cannot prove the cor-
rectness over all cases. The latter one can provide a com-
plete proof based on abstractions of unbounded network.
However, it usually needs user intervention and expertise in
verification. The two kinds of technique are illustrated by
verifications against some key properties such as stability,
loop-freedom and deadlock-freedom. To conclude, they can
be used to find faults and prove correctness, respectively.
It has been shown that these verification techniques for key
properties are feasible in practice. We believe that they can
be applied to other protocols of Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), and together aid the development of correct
ad hoc routing protocols and their reliable implementations.
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by the National Natural Science
Foundation of China (61100034, 61170043, 61103185), the
China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (20110491411), the
Jiangsu Planned Projects for Postdoctoral Research Funds
(1101092C), the Start-up Foundation of Nanjing Normal
University (2011119XGQ0072), the Natural Science Foun-
dation of the Higher Education Institutions of Jiangsu
Province (11KJB520009), and the Major Program of Nat-
ural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (BK211005).
The authors wish to thank the editor and the anonymous
referees for their detailed comments and helpful suggestions.
761
References
[1] Ian F. Akyildiz, Weilian Su, Yogesh Sankarasubrama-
niam, and Erdal Cayirci. Wireless sensor networks: a
survey. Computer Networks, 38(4):393–422, 2002.
[2] Christel Baier and Joost-Pieter Katoen. Principles of
Model Checking. The MIT Press, 2008.
[3] Jiri Barnat, Lubos Brim, and Jitka Str´ıbrna´. Dis-
tributed LTL model-checking in SPIN. In Matthew B.
Dwyer, editor, Proceedings of the 8th International
SPIN Workshop on Model Checking Software (SPIN
2001), volume 2057 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 200–216. Springer, 2001.
[4] Gerd Behrmann, Alexandre David, and Kim Guld-
strand Larsen. A tutorial on UPPAAL. In Marco
Bernardo and Flavio Corradini, editors, Formal Meth-
ods for the Design of Real-Time Systems, International
School on Formal Methods for the Design of Com-
puter, Communication and Software Systems (SFM-
RT 2004), volume 3185 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 200–236. Springer, 2004.
[5] Gerd Behrmann, Thomas Hune, and Frits W. Vaan-
drager. Distributing timed model checking - how
the search order matters. In E. Allen Emerson and
A. Prasad Sistla, editors, Proceedings of the 12th Inter-
national Conference on Computer Aided Verification
(CAV 2000), volume 1855 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 216–231. Springer, 2000.
[6] Davide Benetti, Massimo Merro, and Luca Vigano`.
Model checking ad hoc network routing protocols:
Aran vs. endaira. In Jose´ Luiz Fiadeiro, Stefania Gnesi,
and Andrea Maggiolo-Schettini, editors, Proceedings
of the 8th IEEE International Conference on Software
Engineering and Formal Methods (SEFM 2010), pages
191–202. IEEE Computer Society, 2010.
[7] Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Davor Obradovic, and
Carl A. Gunter. Formal verification of standards for
distance vector routing protocols. Journal of the ACM,
49(4):538–576, 2002.
[8] Zhe Chen. On the generative power of ω-grammars and
ω-automata. Fundamenta Informaticae, 111(2):119–
145, 2011.
[9] Zhe Chen and Gilles Motet. System safety require-
ments as control structures. In Proceedings of the 33rd
Annual IEEE International Computer Software and
Applications Conference (COMPSAC 2009), pages
324–331. IEEE Computer Society, 2009.
[10] Zhe Chen and Gilles Motet. Nevertrace claims for
model checking. In Proceedings of the 17th Interna-
tional SPIN Workshop on Model Checking of Software
(SPIN 2010), volume 6349 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 162–179. Springer, 2010.
[11] Zhe Chen and Gilles Motet. Towards better support
for the evolution of safety requirements via the model
monitoring approach. In Proceedings of the 32nd In-
ternational Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE
2010), pages 219–222. ACM, 2010.
[12] Edmund M. Clarke, Orna Grumberg, and Doron A.
Peled. Model Checking. The MIT Press, 2000.
[13] R. de Renesse and A.H. Aghvami. Formal verification
of ad-hoc routing protocols using SPIN model checker.
In Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Mediterranean Elec-
trotechnical Conference (MELECON 2004), volume 3,
pages 1177–1182, 2004.
[14] Alan Dearle, Dharini Balasubramaniam, Jonathan
Lewis, and Ronald Morrison. A component-based
model and language for wireless sensor network appli-
cations. In Proceedings of the 32nd Annual IEEE Inter-
national Computer Software and Applications Confer-
ence (COMPSAC 2008), pages 1303–1308. IEEE Com-
puter Society, 2008.
[15] M.J.C. Gordon and T.F. Melham. Introduction to
HOL: A Theorem-Proving Environment for Higher-
Order Logic. Cambridge University Press, 1993.
[16] C. Hedrick. Routing Information Protocol, RFC 1058.
IETF, 1988.
[17] Gerard J. Holzmann. The model checker SPIN. IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, 23(5):279–295,
1997.
[18] Gerard J. Holzmann. An analysis of bitstate hash-
ing. Formal Methods in System Design, 13(3):289–307,
1998.
[19] Gerard J. Holzmann. The SPIN Model Checker:
Primer and Reference Manual. Addison-Wesley Pro-
fessional, 2003.
[20] Charuwalee Huadmai. Verification of routing policies
by using model checking technique. In Proceedings of
the IEEE 6th International Conference on Intelligent
Data Acquisition and Advanced Computing Systems:
Technology and Applications (IDAACS 2011), Volume
2, pages 711–716. IEEE, 2011.
[21] Michael Huth and Mark Ryan. Logic in Computer
Science: Modelling and Reasoning about Systems, 2nd
Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[22] G. Malkin. RIP Version 2: Carrying Additional Infor-
mation, RFC 1388. IETF, 1993.
[23] G. Malkin. RIP Version 2: Carrying Additional Infor-
mation, RFC 1723. IETF, 1994.
[24] Glenford J. Myers. The Art of Software Testing. Wiley,
1979.
762
[25] Vladimir A. Oleshchuk. Modeling, specification and
verification of ad-hoc sensor networks using SPIN.
Computer Standards & Interfaces, 28(2):159–165,
2005.
[26] Charles E. Perkins. Ad Hoc Networking. Addison-
Wesley, 2001.
[27] Charles E. Perkins and Elizabeth M. Belding-Royer.
Ad-hoc on-demand distance vector routing. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Mobile Computing
Systems and Applications (WMCSA 1999), pages 90–
100. IEEE Computer Society, 1999.
[28] Charles E. Perkins, Elizabeth M. Belding-Royer, and
S. Das. Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)
Routing, RFC 3561. IETF, 2003.
[29] Y. Rekhter and T. Li. A Border Gateway Protocol 4
(BGP-4), RFC 1771. IETF, 1995.
[30] Y. Rekhter and T. Li. A Border Gateway Protocol 4
(BGP-4), RFC 4271. IETF, 2006.
[31] E.M. Royer and Chai-Keong Toh. A review of current
routing protocols for ad hoc mobile wireless networks.
IEEE Personal Communications, 6(2):46–55, 1999.
[32] Oliver Sharma, Jonathan Lewis, Alice Miller, Alan
Dearle, Dharini Balasubramaniam, Ronald Morrison,
and Joe Sventek. Towards verifying correctness of wire-
less sensor network applications using insense and spin.
In Corina S. Pasareanu, editor, Proceedings of the 16th
International SPIN Workshop on Model Checking Soft-
ware (SPIN 2009), volume 5578 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 223–240. Springer, 2009.
[33] M. Llanos Tobarra, Diego Cazorla, Fernando Cuar-
tero, Gregorio Dı´az, and Mar´ıa-Emilia Cambronero.
Model checking wireless sensor network security pro-
tocols: Tinysec + leap + tinypk. Telecommunication
Systems, 40(3-4):91–99, 2009.
[34] Christian Tschudin, Richard Gold, Olof Rensfelt, and
Oskar Wibling. LUNAR - a lightweight underlay
network ad-hoc routing protocol and implementa-
tion. In Proceedings of Next Generation Teletraffic
and Wired/Wireless Advanced Networking (NEW2AN
2004), 2004.
[35] Oskar Wibling, Joachim Parrow, and Arnold Neville
Pears. Automatized verification of ad hoc routing pro-
tocols. In Proceedings of the 24th IFIP WG 6.1 In-
ternational Conference on Formal Techniques for Net-
worked and Distributed Systems (FORTE 2004), vol-
ume 3235 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
343–358. Springer, 2004.
[36] Oskar Wibling, Joachim Parrow, and Arnold Neville
Pears. Ad hoc routing protocol verification through
broadcast abstraction. In Proceedings of the 25th
IFIP WG 6.1 International Conference on Formal
Techniques for Networked and Distributed Systems
(FORTE 2005), volume 3731 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 128–142. Springer, 2005.
[37] Daqiang Zhang, Min Chen, Hongyu Huang, and Minyi
Guo. Decentralized checking of context inconsistency
in pervasive computing environments. The Journal of
Supercomputing, 2:1–18, 2011.
[38] Daqiang Zhang, Jingyu Zhou, Minyi Guo, Jiannong
Cao, and Tianbao Li. Tasa: Tag-free activity sensing
using RFID tag arrays. IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib.
Syst., 22(4):558–570, 2011.
[39] Daqiang Zhang, Zhangbin Zhou, Qing Liu, Tianyi
Zhan, and Genli Ji. Asynchronous event detection for
context inconsistency in pervasive computing. Interna-
tional Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing,
10:21–30, 2012.
763
